Peering inside the ‘black box’: The impact of management-side representatives on the industrial relations climate of organizations by Campbell, Shelagh & Weststar, Johanna
Western University 
Scholarship@Western 
Management and Organizational Studies 
Publications 
Management and Organizational Studies 
Department 
6-3-2019 
Peering inside the ‘black box’: The impact of management-side 
representatives on the industrial relations climate of 
organizations 
Shelagh Campbell 
University of Regina 
Johanna Weststar 
Western University, weststar@uwo.ca 
Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lib.uwo.ca/mospub 
 Part of the Business Administration, Management, and Operations Commons, and the Work, Economy 
and Organizations Commons 
Citation of this paper: 
Campbell, Shelagh and Weststar, Johanna, "Peering inside the ‘black box’: The impact of management-
side representatives on the industrial relations climate of organizations" (2019). Management and 
Organizational Studies Publications. 15. 
https://ir.lib.uwo.ca/mospub/15 
1 
 
Peering inside the ‘black box’: The impact of management-side representatives on the 
industrial relations climate of organizations. 
 
Shelagh Campbell, University of Regina, shelagh.campbell@uregina.ca 
Johanna Weststar, University of Western Ontario, weststar@uwo.ca 
 
Author Accepted Version. First published and should be cited as: 
Campbell, S. & Weststar, J. (2019). Peering inside the ‘black box’: The impact of management-
side representatives on the industrial relations climate of organizations. Labor Studies Journal. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/0160449X19852696 
 
Introduction 
The industrial relations (IR) climate of an organization is a general measure of the overall 
tone of the labor-management relationship (Dastmalchian, 2008). It is typically measured by a 
set of variables that represent the norms, attitudes, feelings, and behaviors prevalent at the 
workplace including “fairness and mutual regard” (Dastmalchian, 2008, p 569). Research has 
shown that the IR climate of an organization is related to productivity, efficiency, general 
employee satisfaction, union loyalty, and organizational commitment (see Angle & Perry, 1986; 
Dastmalchian & Ng, 1990; Deery, Erwin & Iverson, 1999; Deery & Iverson, 2005; Huszczo & 
Hoyer, 1994; Redman & Snape, 2006; Wagar, 1997; Wagar & Rondeau, 2002). The challenge 
with creating positive labor-management relations is that the web of interactions that contribute 
to the overall industrial relations atmosphere is complex. Interactions with the potential to impact 
trust and fairness in the workplace occur at all levels of the organization and involve various 
individuals: employees, front-line managers, union stewards, union regional representatives, 
union executives, middle and senior managers, management-side labor relations representatives, 
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etc. In this research we focus on one group – the management-side labor relations representatives 
(MSRs) – to determine the impact that their day-to-day actions and interactions have on the 
overall IR climate of their organizations.  
Our study develops a model that attempts to challenge and probe the universal face of 
‘management’ at the individual level of analysis and recognizes the multitude of interactions that 
management-side representatives are engaged in each day.  Specifically, we further unpack the 
‘management-related variables’ of Deery and Iverson (2005) and situate some of the 
organizational structure and facilitative IR context variables of Dastmalchian (2008) in a 
previously understudied group: the MSR.  The Labor Relations Department (sometimes housed 
within Human Resource Departments) is a key management-side player, particularly in large 
unionized environments.  The Department includes specialist Managers and labor relations 
Representatives (for ease of reference both are included in our use of the term MSR) as well as 
support staff.  This group works specifically on issues related to the labor-management 
relationship such as collective bargaining, grievances, arbitrations, daily interpretation of the 
collective agreement, participation on joint-committees, etc.  They come into regular contact 
with front-line and upper managers and supervisors as well as union stewards, regional 
representatives, and executives and often intervene in the midst of conflicts among these groups.  
It has been noted that the specific strategies of management and union officials and the role that 
each plays is a critical determinant of the IR climate (Deery & Iverson, 2005); that union and 
management officials are instrumental in setting the IR tone through bargaining and grievance 
negotiation (Gordon & Ladd, 1990), and that it is detrimental to assume that a quality union-
management relationship rests solely with the cooperative stance of the union (Huszczo & 
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Hoyer, 1994 p, 849).  Despite this pivotal role, however, the activities and impact of the MSR 
have been often overlooked in the recent IR climate or broader IR literature. 
There has been research on the impact that union stewards have on rank-and-file member 
attitudes and on the grievance process as union stewards act as a front-line intermediary between 
the rank-and-file and their union, and often between the rank-and-file and their direct managers / 
supervisors (see Dalton & Todor, 1981 and 1982; Darlington, 2002; Skarlicki & Latham, 1997). 
The MSR plays a similar and arguably significant role as the support to front-line management 
and counter-part to union stewards and the union executive. Yet the role of the MSR has been 
overlooked in the academic literature. We propose that there are actions in which MSRs engage 
that promote positive IR climate and those that do not. We also propose that different groups in 
the organization will have different assessments of the IR climate and the effectiveness of an 
MSR in facilitating a positive climate. 
   This research is valuable to the academic community in its support of greater 
understanding of IR climate, as limited research of this type has been conducted.  But more than 
this, the research should help unionized organizations by cuing them to identify behaviors and 
actions on the part of the MSR(s) that would benefit the labor-management relationship.  Finally, 
the impact of personal antecedents of MSRs may inform recruitment and training strategies for 
firms. 
 
A Model of Industrial Relations Climate 
Dastmalchian (2008) provides a comprehensive review of the development of ‘industrial 
relations climate’ as a measurable construct throughout the sociological and industrial relations 
literature.  It is from this work that we draw our basic definitions and assumptions and gather 
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variables for a model we test in this study. Dastmalchian (2008; 563) states that IR climate is 
different from, but related to, organizational culture – “with culture signifying deeply rooted 
values, and climate referring to the atmosphere and the context of relationships.”  IR climate then 
refers to the nature and quality of the labor-management relationship (Dastmalchian, 2008) and it 
can form a bridge between structural characteristics of an organization and industrial relations 
outcomes (Nicholson, 1979).  
Though others have been proposed (see Angle and Perry, 1986; Huszczo and Hoyer, 
1994) the IR climate measure developed and tested by Dastmalchian, Blyton and Adamson 
(1991) is the most prevalent.  The complete form of this measure consists of 20 items that 
represent five aspects of IR climate: fairness, union-management consultation, mutual regard, 
membership support for unions and union legitimacy (Dastmalchian, 2008; 569-70).  
Abbreviated versions have been successfully used and validated (i.e. Deery & Iverson, 2005; 
Wagar, 1997; Wagar & Rondeau, 2002) and the 10-item scale is acknowledged as an effective 
measure (Deery, Erwin & Iverson, 1999). 
Outcomes 
In recent decades there has been increased interest in the concept and measures of IR 
climate as a predictor for organizational outcomes.  Studies have found positive relationships 
between IR climate or labor-management co-operation and outcomes such as organizational 
performance (Wagar, 1997), employee satisfaction (Wagar & Rondeau, 2002), productivity and 
customer service quality (Deery & Iverson, 2005), organizational commitment (Deery, Iverson & 
Erwin, 1994), union loyalty and work attendance (Deery, Erwin & Iverson, 1999; Iverson, 
Buttigieg & Maguire, 2003), and the success of joint union-management committees (Cooke, 
1992). Some recent studies have examined labor climate and union commitment with a focus on 
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the individual and her relationship with her union (Snape & Redman, 2012). As well, Bacon, 
Blyton and Dastmalchian (2005) found associations between positive IR climate and 
collaborative practices between union and management when introducing organizational 
changes.  More recently, Cheung & Wu (2014) examined labor climate in the context of leader-
member exchange and participatory management.  This latter study is but one example of the 
expansion of IR climate research across the globe. These studies help to establish the importance 
of the role that individuals, and the interactions between those individuals, have within the labor-
management relationship.  As Dastmalchian (2008; 563) concludes, “IR actors make choices 
about their approach and strategy...strategies based on creating IR climates rooted in trust, 
fairness and genuine desire to provide support and legitimacy for unions (and management) pay 
off and need to be an integral part of the process of IR development.”  
Antecedents 
Given that positive IR climate has beneficial outcomes for management, unions, and 
employees, who then is responsible for creating these climates of trust and fairness?  What role is 
played by management, the union, and employees themselves?  The IR climate emerges out of a 
complex web of relationships that are shaped by the organizational and union structures and 
ideologies, organizational and labor-management processes, as well as the unique characteristics 
of the individuals involved.  Dastmalchian et al. (1991) first attempted to model this complexity 
through the operationalization of organizational level concepts such as the organizational context 
(i.e. centralization and stability), organizational structure (i.e., bureaucracy and flexibility), the 
human resources context (i.e., HR changes and internal labor markets), and the IR context (i.e., 
facilitative relations, union characteristics and history, member commitment). Their analysis 
supported the importance of IR climate in examining organizational outcomes in unionized 
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environments.  They concluded that the impact of organizational and structural variables on 
organizational outcomes can be better understood when viewed through their impact on 
perceptions of climate.  Therefore, it is the context within which the interaction between labor 
and management takes place that is critical to achieving desired results.   
The broader literature reflects three levels of analysis: organizational, work unit and 
individual employees (Dastmalchian, 2008).  Alternatively, Kochan, Katz and McKersie (1986) 
address strategic, functional, and workplace levels of analysis.  A criticism of research in this 
area is that analysis often spans these different levels in an unsatisfactory manner, challenging 
conclusions that attribute outcomes at one level to actions at another. Within the IR climate 
literature it is therefore important to more explicitly examine the context in terms of level of 
analysis and conduct studies which clearly identify what is happening at specific levels of 
interaction between labor and management. The study described here focuses on the individual 
level of analysis and examines the impact of characteristics and behaviors of key labor relations 
actors at the individual level.  These organizational actors have the potential to influence a range 
of factors that impact IR climate. 
At this level, Deery et al. (1999) provided more specificity from the perspective of 
individual employees.  Probing for the antecedents of employee perceptions of IR climate, they 
modeled personal employee characteristics, work-setting or labor process variables (i.e., 
autonomy, job satisfaction, distributive justice), and environmental variables (namely union 
instrumentality).  IR climate then acted as a moderator between these antecedents and measures 
of organizational commitment, union loyalty and absenteeism.  The main conclusion was the 
importance of union instrumentality.  Employees were more likely to report a positive IR climate 
if they felt that their union was an effective agent in representing and advancing their interests.  
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Thus unions (through their officials) play a key role in the development of perceptions of labor 
climate.   
However, union officials are just one side of this equation.  In order to actively pursue 
their members’ interests, unions must interact with management.  As Gordon and Ladd (1990) 
show, key individuals in establishing the IR climate are both the union and the management 
officials who together set the tone for important interactions such as bargaining and grievance 
resolution. Indeed, it has been common to measure firm outcomes in the form of grievances 
filed, but Wagar (1997) notes that little attention is paid to management strategies and activities 
beyond corporate polices of information sharing and team-based HRM à la High-Performance 
Work Systems (HPWS) (see Huselid, 1995; Pfeffer & Veiga, 1999; Wood, 1999).   
Deery and Iverson (2005) attempt to close this research gap with a new model of the 
antecedents and consequences of IR climate.  They specifically model the activities and 
ideologies found in interactions of union and management.  In their model, management-related 
variables include: sharing information with the union, facilitating union business, open 
communication with employees and procedural justice.  Union-related variables include: 
integrative bargaining approach, responsiveness to members, and two measures of union 
instrumentality.  Also included in their model are two employee-related variables that measure 
the willingness of individual employees to support cooperative labor-management relations. The 
authors conclude that both management and the union play a role in fostering positive IR climate 
– specifically that management accepted the legitimacy of the union as a stakeholder in the 
organization, that the union adopted a problem-solving approach in bargaining, and that there 
were fair procedures for resolving workplace grievances. 
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The preceding review of the IR climate literature is synthesized in Figure 1.  The figure 
brings together various components of IR climate with corresponding outcomes at the unit and 
firm level, to illustrate the relationships defined in the literature to date. We highlight the center 
boxes to position our study within the IR climate gestalt, contributing an individual level of 
analysis focused on the MSR.   
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Figure 1: Summary of IR Climate 
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IR Climate 
  
The summary above reflects the finding that, broadly speaking, management strategies impact IR 
climate; how and to what extent these strategies are implemented has not been fully explored.  
Figure 1 draws attention to the unknown impact on IR climate of individual job behaviors 
enacted by labor relations specialists.  The current study is an additional attempt to understand 
the “black box” of factors that contribute to positive IR climate by exploring the perspectives of 
front-line management-side IR specialists. Based on a set of qualitative interviews with MSRs, a 
case study of a unionized public company, and a national survey of both MSRs and union 
representatives across Canada, we propose a model that explores how the actions and strategic 
choices of IR actors relate to individual characteristics and organization structure to promote 
positive IR climate.  
 
Building a Model – Contributory Data and Methods 
Our goal was to refine the summary in Figure 1, which was theoretically based on the 
extant literature, in order to examine more closely the impact of MSRs on IR climate.  We 
accomplished this through the analysis of three different forms of data gathered at three time 
periods. The first two studies established measures of individual MSR behaviors and the third 
study tested these in a national survey. 
Developing the model 
First, we used data from an interview-based pilot study of MSRs (Weststar, Melenchuk & 
Nowak, 2008) on the content of MSR jobs.  The study included 20 MSRs from across Canada. 
Participants were solicited through professional networks, the alumni mailing list of the Queen’s 
University Master of Industrial Relations program and snowball sampling. Interviews were semi-
  
structured and lasted 40-60 minutes. They were audio-recorded and transcribed. In the interviews, 
the MSRs were asked questions about the content of and relationship between their job duties 
and performance appraisals. Participants were also asked about their relationship with their union 
counterpart(s), their views on the general labor relations relationship at their organization, the 
short version of the IR climate scale (Deery, Erwin & Iverson, 1999) as well as demographic 
indicators. The sample was 66% female with an age range of 36-56. The length of time in an 
MSR role ranged from 3-18 years and time at the current organization ranged from five months 
to 18 years. The sample was evenly balanced between the public and private sector and included 
provincial and federal public service, transport, mining and education with organizational sizes 
from 600-15,000 workers. All had established union contracts of 30 years or more. Interview 
transcripts were analyzed by three researchers who independently identified, and then 
collectively discussed and reconciled, the thematic codes that emerged from the data. Each 
interview was also summarized into a job profile for each participant which identified central job 
duties of the MSR role.  
The second source of data that helped to define our model was collected in 2012-13 
through collaboration with a large public sector organization – Company X - who participated in 
interviews and helped to develop some of our measures. This organization was intended as a 
research site for a full empirical test of our model with a matched-pair sample of MSRs and 
union counterparts. This design would have tested individual level metrics on a robust measure 
of IR climate in specific organizational units and at the firm level.  The employer withdrew at the 
final hour and that version of the study was suspended.  However, our interactions to that point 
provided valuable information to our model development process and confirmed a number of 
hypothesized relationships in the model.  
  
 The following section summarizes the key insights gained from the first two sources of 
data vis à vis our model development.  We will then proceed to describe the third study that 
ultimately tested the our model. 
Interviews with MSRs – The Importance of Trust and Proactivity: 
Over 80% of the interview respondents in the first study mentioned at some point in their 
interview that they had positive relationships with their counterparts and/or generally positive IR 
climate at their organization. However, these summary judgements were often made ‘on the 
whole’ and closer analysis revealed that the MSRs placed many constraints, conditions and 
clarifiers on their assessment. This uncertainty is also reflected in the IR climate scale 
administered to each interviewee; the mean score was 3.0 on a 5-point scale. What was clear 
across the interviews is that IR climate is dynamic and shifting; positive relations take a long 
time to develop, yet are quickly disrupted.  Thematic analysis of the interview data revealed 
variables relating to specific job characteristics and behaviors that were perceived to be 
connected to IR climate through the development of trust and respect. These are discussed below 
and were used to populate our model.    
Tenure 
An important theme in the interview data was that positive working relationships between 
MSRs and their union counterparts was directly attributed to the personal relationships that they 
had built with those counterparts. These relationships are usually formed over many years, and 
the majority of MSRs mentioned that trust and respect develop and grow over the course of a 
relationship:  
There was a bump in the road when he first got in. Which is a normal thing 
because you don’t know exactly what to expect and you have to develop that 
relationship. You don’t know how this person will deal with issues. And how 
you’re both going to work together. It does take some time. (Interviewee I02) 
  
 
One-quarter of the respondents explicitly said that early in the process of developing a 
relationship with their counterpart, it was necessary to “feel out” the other:  
I think something that affects labor relations climate is turnover. If it’s high I 
think it’s tougher…but slowly over time, as you start to understand each other’s 
personalities and feel each other out, you build trust. (Interviewee I01)  
 
The MSRs stated that this familiarization process is necessary as it acts as a foundation 
for all future interactions with counterparts and sets the stage for further dealings.  One MSR in 
particular spoke to the effort required to create and maintain positive relationships and the time 
needed for the impact of those positive interactions to percolate throughout an organization and 
undo poor relations from the past:  
Understanding the history of the development of the culture of an organization is 
essential to assessing labor relations climate. Change takes time and although 
proactive measures may be in place to improve the climate, employee 
expectations and attitudes change very slowly. For example, 30 years of mistrust 
and hostile union-management relationships will not change within a couple years 
just because you have new participants and current progressive practices in place. 
(Interviewee I05) 
 
We observed a high degree of volatility, or high positional turnover, within the 
organizations represented by our interviewees. There was turnover among union Presidents and 
representatives and among MSR clients. Note that the term ‘client’ was used by a number of 
MSRs in reference to the internal managers whom they advise and serve in labor relations 
matters. One MSR discussed this issue a lot and attributed managerial-side turnover to the 
current state of the labor market and the retirement of baby boomers while they felt that 
economic volatility, organizational restructuring and specific union policies relating to tenure 
were contributing factors on the union side. Generally speaking, these changes in personnel were 
felt to hamper the relationship-building of the MSRs and their union counterparts and reduce the 
  
potential for positive labor climate. Turnover on the union side was cited as a common 
frustration for a number of the MSRs because every time the union representation changed, the 
relationship went back to “square one.” 
I think every time you get a new [Union] President you have to start all over 
again…There is a new period of when I’m going to have to break them in or 
vice versa. (Interviewee I06) 
 
That said, we observed cases where a new face and approach greatly improved relations and 
others where the legacy of an adversarial relationship remained despite new actors:  
…the personalities and the roles change so often. And that’s the company side 
and also the union side. You may have had a very adversarial style person in the 
role for a while that could have negatively affected relations for a long time and 
then just have players switch. There’s still a lot of damage done from the 
previous person. There’s a lot of variables that go into it. (Interviewee I01) 
 
 
Every MSRs to whom we spoke said that the level of achieved familiarity and trust had 
implications for all formal and informal interactions with their counterparts, including the ability 
to speak off the record and admit fault.  Thus, tenure was included as a variable. 
Cooperation 
In addition, the prevailing view among the MSRs was that adversarial approaches 
hindered the union-management relationship. While it was universally acknowledged that MSRs 
and union representatives will continue to disagree over many employee/management issues, in 
their accounts MSRs were inclined to focus on and prefer a more cooperative, collaborative 
relationship. It was felt that this collaborative relationship is necessary for both parties in order 
for each side to provide a high level of service to their organizations:    
We have some folks on the union side that aren’t extreme in their thinking. So 
they understand that the business has to run for them to make money. We’re going 
to be held to account in terms of how we treat people, what we introduce. But it’s 
not going to be at the expense of the business. (Interviewee P01) 
  
 
This perception of the importance of cooperative attitudes was reinforced for MSRs when 
they faced high turnover in union positions. As one MSR articulated, new and perhaps 
more strident unionists needed to learn to work together with management within the 
system of labor relations and this came from exposure to front-line work with a 
management counterpart: 
…you got union officials who don’t get communicated to enough from upper 
management, or [who are] mistrusting management. They sit in the board room 
and tackle each other. (Interviewee I01)  
 
As a result, Deery & Iverson’s (2005) measure of attitudes about the need for cooperation among 
IR actors was included in the model. 
Specific job behaviors, Informality and Proactivity 
The narratives of the MSRs we interviewed fit with research that calls for attention to the 
way IR or HR processes are carried out as unit-specific variables as opposed to 
operationalizations that just measure the existence of particular bundles of HR practices at the 
organizational level (see Boxall & Macky, 2009). This is because of the considerable variation in 
impact on occupational groups, structures and activities across an organization. How certain 
practices are employed is a key to understanding their impact.  Reed (1989) also draws our 
attention to the importance of how and by whom interactions are carried out in a study of union 
organizers. He finds that the personal characteristics of union organizers influence the outcome 
of organizing campaigns, even when the tactics used by organizers and employers (factors 
known to affect vote outcomes) are controlled. This supports the notion that there is value in 
studying the characteristics of MSRs as well as the tactics they use in managing the union-
management relationship. The interviews also resulted in job profiles which were created for 
each MSR interviewee.  The profiles consisted of a list of specific job behaviors that we 
  
developed into variables for the model. Behaviors included: consultation with the union, 
participation in union-management committees, interpretation of the collective agreement, 
grievance handling, arbitration, corporate initiatives, and training and coaching of front-line 
managers and supervisors. The interview analysis also surfaced the key themes of informality 
and proactivity with respect to how job behaviors are carried out. For instance, interviewees 
mentioned the value of face to face contact, the feeling of comfort to just ‘drop in’ to speak to 
their counterpart (either in person or over the phone), the ability to speak candidly off the 
record and also the ability to take action to avoid problems rather than repeatedly react to the 
same issues:  
…the difference between having a relationship where you can chat with 
someone in person, you can be so much more real in person than you can be 
over the phone and especially by email. (Interviewee I05) 
 
I think you can really tell where our relationship is when you can have your 
public debates, then you can go retreat yourself and the union person back and 
close the door and then have an honest discussion about what’s going on. 
(Interviewee P01) 
 
I think anything proactive would definitely be a duty that I think companies 
could get to the point where they’re not doing the day-to-day fire fighting…it 
seems like you’re running around in circles fighting the same issues over and 
over…A lot of times changes can’t be made because you’re not the change 
maker… (Interviewee I01)  
 
Therefore, we included measures which would allow for assessment of the frequency and 
perceived importance of certain MSR behaviors and also whether the interactions related to job 
behaviors were conducted by email, phone or face-to-face. We also included a stand-alone 
measure of the degree of informality in the relationship with union counterparts and a measure 
of the degree of proactivity in MSR behaviors. 
 
Case of Company X: Support for the Embeddedness of the MSR 
  
As mentioned above, a large public sector organization initially signed on as a research 
partner and supported the development of this study by participating in interviews and assisting 
with the development and operationalization of the variables in our model. The Labor Relations 
Department of the firm also provided insight and suggestions as well as data on their internal 
operations that helped to shape the measures used in the model. In particular, they shared an 
internal client satisfaction survey that detailed MSR job behaviors. This corroborated and helped 
to refine the list of job behaviors that we had built from the MSR interviews discussed above.  
Through these research interactions, Company X became a test case in our model 
development process. This case illustrated the need for a model that could capture and 
triangulate complex relationships. As described below, it was clear from this phase of the study 
development that the actions of the Labor Relations Department intersect those of operational 
management, unions and employees at many places and create many interaction points for the 
feelings related to IR climate to arise.   
Company X is a large public sector organization that operates across Canada.  There are 5 
bargaining agents who have national collective agreements with Company X.  The Labor 
Relations Department employs over 100 people and is subdivided into 6 regional offices and one 
national office.  Each regional office is headed by a regional specialist Manager and staffed by 7-
8 labor relations representatives.  The work of these representatives is designated by collective 
agreement rather than sub-regions or specific tasks; therefore, the MSRs deal exclusively with 
one union across all job functions and all terms of the collective agreement.  These individuals 
are labor relations generalists in this sense.  The national office is home to the Head of the Labor 
Relations Department as well as a Director for each collective agreement, a Director who 
oversees the regional Managers and one floating Director who is often devoted to strategic 
  
issues.  The national office focuses on collective bargaining and issues of national concern or 
implication while the regional offices deal with the issues that arise through daily administration 
of the collective agreement(s).    
At Company X, the MSR interacts with all levels of operational management and also has 
contact with local union executives and regional union representatives.  MSRs also consider 
other internal functional units such as human resources (HR), public relations (PR) and senior 
management as their ‘clients’ when labor-related matters are concerned.  
The case of Company X shows that each individual involved in union-management 
interactions has the potential to influence relationships at various levels of the organization and, 
subsequently, to have small or large impacts on perceptions of IR climate.  To generalize, within 
the operational chain of command, individual employees interact with each other and with their 
direct supervisors/managers who then interact with the managerial ranks above them, and so on 
up to the head of the company.  Within the union, a similar process occurs with individual 
employees interacting with elected representatives such as stewards or committee members, 
those members interacting with the local executive, and the local executive (if applicable) 
interacting with larger parent unions.  Between these groups, union stewards and committee 
members will have regular contact with front-line and perhaps mid-level managers.  Union 
executive members or regional representatives will have more contact with mid-level to upper 
level managers and representatives from parent unions will interact with members of senior 
management.  In most medium- to large-sized enterprises there are also tangential interactions 
among all these individuals and various levels of the HR department.  A specific component of 
HR departments, oftentimes forming their own functional unit, is the labor relations department 
where MSRs are situated.   
  
The interactions between and among the above groups can also take many forms.  In all 
unionized environments there are formalized procedures for interactions around grievances, 
arbitration and bargaining.  Additionally, there may be provision for joint labor-management 
committees on various topics and these occur with a medium degree of formality and structure 
(for instance, Joseph, 2003; Hall, Forrest, Sears & Carlan, 2006; Shrey, Hursh, Gallina, Slinn & 
White, 2006).  However, there are many explicit and implicit informal interactions surrounding 
these formal mechanisms.  Add to this the constant day-to-day informal interactions on 
operational matters and very quickly the ‘locus’ of interaction for the development of IR climate 
perceptions becomes impossible to specify.  In actual fact it is the overall impact of all of these 
interactions, informal to formal and at all levels of management and union hierarchies, that 
contribute to a final sense of IR climate.   
In order to conduct an assessment at the level of the individual and focus on the as yet 
understudied role of the MSR, an adjustment to the IR climate model presented in Figure 1 is 
necessary in order to include the new variables identified in our interviews and case study data. 
 
Coupled with the many IR climate models currently in the literature, the preceding 
exploration of the interviews with MSRs and the labor relations context at Company X generated 
rich insights that permitted the development of a preliminary labor climate model with the MSR 
as the focus (Figure 2). We proposed that three groups of antecedents (demographic, structural 
and attitudinal) impact the actions and activities that the MSR carries out on the job and these 
actions and activities then impact the IR climate of the organization. Demographic antecedents 
include the typical variables of gender and age as well as tenure (which we saw was important 
from the MSR interviews). We also include a measure for education. This is also a standard 
  
demographic variable, but has the added potential for import because of the growth in 
specialized education in the field of labor relations. We anticipate that this advanced training 
may impact how MSRs do their job. The structural antecedents of job autonomy and job 
satisfaction were retained from Deery et al. (1999) and the attitudinal antecedent of views on 
about labor-management cooperation was taken from Deery and Iverson (2005).  We include 
MSR instrumentality as a moderating factor of the impact of MSR actions on IR climate to 
balance the inclusion of union instrumentality. As Deery et al. (1999) found, employee 
perceptions of union instrumentality are related to IR climate. We extend this reasoning to 
propose that the perceptions of instrumentality that each side has for their counterpart (i.e., how 
well the union representative thinks the MSR is doing their job and vice versa) will impact their 
working relationship and therefore IR climate.    
 
  
Figure 2: Proposed Model of MSR Impact on IR Climate 
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Survey Pilot Study: A Test of a Model of MSR Impact on IR Climate 
The third set of data, which tested our model, was collected through an online survey of 
MSRs and union representatives across Canada in October 2013. The survey instrument was 
administered through Survey Monkey and used snowball and network sampling techniques.  The 
authors drew upon academic and industry contacts to reach as broad a population as possible, 
sending 75 personalized invitations to the survey to individuals in the field of labor relations.  As 
well, targeted invitations were sent to labor relations programs requesting distribution to their 
alumni and current students; LinkedIn contacts in labor relations were invited to participate by 
direct message and through public posts with a link to the survey, reaching 800 distinct 
connections; personalized invitations were sent to all Provincial and Federal labor councils, with 
copies to the district labor council branches across Canada for distribution to their memberships 
and the Canadian Bar Association Labor Law group was also invited to participate.  The unions 
at Company X were also invited to maintain their participation. These participants were directed 
to one of four surveys tailored to either MSRs or Union Representatives, each in English or 
French. The survey instruments were written in English and translated by Translation Services at 
the L'Institut Français, University of Regina. The translated surveys were tested by a sample of 
native French and English speaking academics for clarity and time to completion.  The surveys 
posed identical questions, simply replacing union with management-side labor relations 
department labels.  
 
Results from the online survey 
We obtained completed surveys from 384 responses (218 union, 166 MSR), the majority 
of whom were English speakers (207 union, 162 MSR).  Of these responses 273 included 
  
complete measures of the dependent variable (climate).  Data were examined for normal 
distributions and found to be acceptable for further analysis. Table 1 includes operationalization 
details and descriptive statistics for the variables examined1. To completely explore the potential 
relationships between variables in different parts of the model, we conducted a number of 
correlation, t-test and regression analyses on sub-elements of our proposed model. These are 
summarized below and in Tables 1-5, but first we will describe the participants in our sample 
and discuss some ad hoc comparisons between the MSR and union representative sub-samples. It 
is important to recall that due to the withdrawal of Company X, we did not have a matched 
sample of respondents in this survey. As such, we could not conduct a full test of the model as 
depicted in Figure 2 because the climate and instrumentality assessments of MSR counterparts 
could not be mapped to job behaviours of those MSRs. As well, a full regression of all elements 
of the model produced lackluster results due to the small sample size and large number of 
variables and its results are not reported.  This aspect of our study represents an opportunity for 
further research using a larger sample or one matched within a single organization. 
Table 1: Variable Operationalization and Descriptive Statistics 
Variable (all items measured on a 6-point scale from 1 (strongly 
disagree) to 6 (strongly agree) unless otherwise indicated 
N Mean SD 
IR Climate (10-item scale from Deery, Erwin & Iverson, 1999; α = 
95; sample item: A sense of fairness is associated with management 
dealings in this place) 
273 3.27 1.25 
Job autonomy (single item:  I have a lot of say in deciding how to 
do my job) 
91  
MSR only 
4.03 0.80 
Job satisfaction (single-item: I am satisfied with my job) 93 
MSR only 
4.73 1.10 
Cooperation (3-item scale from Deery & Iverson 2005; α .68: a) It 
is important for unions and management to work together, b) 
Unions should not work too closely with management (reverse), c) 
It is every employee’s duty to ensure that the relationship between 
205 4.81 1.00 
                                                 
1 Although not currently in a repository, the authors will be happy to share variables and data to support further investigation in 
this realm.  Please contact the corresponding author. 
 
  
the union and management is good) 
Informality (4-item scale; α = .81; a) I often speak to union clients 
‘off the record’ to resolve issues; b) I often speak to management 
clients ‘off the record’ to resolve issues; c) Overall, I have a trusting 
and respectful relationship with my union clients (or the MSR) ; d) 
Overall, I have a trusting and respectful relationship with my 
management clients (or managers)) 
186 3.58 1.41 
Proactivity (7-item scale; α .91: Sample items: I initiate contact 
with management or union clients when I foresee a problem or an 
issue; I often take actions in my job that prevent problems from 
arising in the first place) 
66 
MSR only 
4.98 1.05 
Instrumentality of counterpart 
MSR evaluates union rep (7-item scale; α .93; Sample items: Issues 
that are raised are addressed and/or resolved quickly, The Union rep 
is available when I need him/her; The Union rep provides adequate 
answers to ad hoc inquiries) 
Union rep evaluates MSR (same scale with different referent; α 
.944) 
88 
 
 
 
 
152 
4.09 
 
 
 
 
3.39 
1.23 
 
 
 
 
1.33 
Gender (categorical)  
     Male 
     Female 
     Prefer not to disclose 
396  
0.25 
0.25 
0.50 
 
0.43 
0.43 
0.56 
Age (continuous) 384 46.3 8.15 
Tenure with the organization (continuous) 205 13.42 10.3 
Education (categorical) 
     Below Masters (Union N=78; MSR N=42) 
     Masters or more (Union N=42; MSR N=43) 
205  
0.63 
0.37 
 
0.48 
0.48 
Workplace sector (categorical) 
     Public 
     Private 
     Other (incl. both) 
328 
 
 
0.65 
0.30 
0.05 
 
0.48 
0.46 
0.22 
 
 
Comparison of MSR and Union Representatives 
Our data paints the following snapshot of the typical ‘labor relations actor’. On the 
management side, MSRs were on average 44 years old, 60% work in the private sector, and they 
were just as likely to be male as female. Half of our respondents were front-line MSRs and the 
other half were more senior managers. On the union side, representatives were on average 48 
years old, almost three times more likely to work in the public sector, and just as likely to be 
male as female. Slightly more of our respondents were higher-level union officials as opposed to 
  
front-line stewards/representatives. Across both management- and union-side, organization size 
ranged from fewer than 100 unionized members to more than 10,000. Respondents came from 
across Canada, with Ontario dominating, and Atlantic Canada, Quebec, and northern Canada 
underrepresented.  We took advantage of the evenness of the management/union responses in the 
sample to conduct some ad hoc comparative analysis, which we discuss below.  
We observed differences in the responses from MSRs and union representatives. These 
are summarized in Table 2. MSRs rated IR climate more favorably than their union counterparts. 
There were no differences in climate ratings based on gender or workplace sector (public or 
private). MSRs also had a more positive attitude towards cooperation in the workplace compared 
with union representatives.  
Interestingly, there was no significant difference between MSRs and union reps in their 
rating of their counterpart’s instrumentality which indicates that they feel similarly about their 
counterpart’s effectiveness.  Recall that this measure is the evaluation by each respondent of 
their frontline counterpart; we do not have a matched sample. The questions relating to 
proactivity and job autonomy were only asked of the MSRs so no comparisons are possible. 
Table 2: Means of Key Variables for MSR and Union Representatives 
 Means SD T-test 
IR Climate MSR: 
Union Rep: 
3.88 
2.79 
1.15 
1.10 
t(271) = -7.96*** 
Cooperation MSR: 
Union Rep: 
5.30 
4.46 
1.06 
0.66 
t(204) = -6.93*** 
Instrumentality MSR: 
Union Rep: 
4.09 
3.38 
1.23 
1.33 
t(238)=-4.06*** 
 
Informality MSR:  
Union Rep: 
4.47 
3.09 
1.28 
1.24 
t(184)=-7.12*** 
Proactivity MSR: 
Union Rep: 
5.08 
not measured 
.91 n/a 
Autonomy MSR: 
Union Rep: 
4.04 
not measured 
.80 n/a 
*** significant at the 0.001 level
  
Table 3 Correlation Matrix  
 
  Climate Cooperation Instrumentality Proactivity Informality 
Job 
Autonomy 
Job 
Satisfaction Age Tenure Education 
Climate   1                   
N 273                   
Cooperation   .485** 1                 
N 206 206                 
Instrumentality   .509** .339** 1               
N 234 206 240               
Proactivity   .430** 0.164 .281* 1             
N 66 61 62 66             
Informality   .564** .566** .446** .730** 1           
N 186 181 182 66 186           
Job Autonomy   .255* -0.097 0.266* .510** .371** 1         
N 91 84 86 64 64 91         
Job 
satisfaction 
  .345** 0.211 .271* .329** 0.059 .345** 1       
N 93 86 88 64 64 91 93       
Age   -0.021 0.051 0.061 0.144 .148* -0.083 0.123 1     
N 273 206 240 66 186 91 93 384     
Tenure   -.310** -0.122 -0.159* -0.046 -0.110 -.218* 0.116 .576** 1   
N 205 205 205 60 180 83 85 205 205   
Education   .177* 0.053 0.108 0.009 0.108 0.036 -0.010 -
.248** 
-.402** 1 
N 205 205 205 60 180 83 85 205 205 205 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
  
Correlation and Regression Results 
Examination of the relationships in the data indicate support for and build upon existing 
theory on IR climate. In our correlation analyses (Table 3) we see that the structural factors of 
job autonomy and job satisfaction, the measure of attitude towards labor-management 
cooperation, and the job behavior variables of instrumentality of counterparts, the degree of 
comfort in counterpart relationships (informality) and a proactive approach by the MSR to IR 
issues are each individually related to positive IR climate. The assessment of informality 
demonstrated one of the strongest positive relationships with our dependent variable of IR 
climate.  
We also found evidence of relationships across our key independent variables. For 
instance, structural constraint in the form of lower job autonomy was related to the MSR taking a 
reactionary approach to IR issues and holding more formal relationships with counterparts. As 
well, holding an attitude supporting cooperation in the labor-management relationship was 
related to measures of informal relationships and counterpart instrumentality. We had attempted 
to include specific MSR tasks or job activities in our model (recall Figure 2); however, only 
frequent contact by phone had a slight positive relationship with climate (data not shown). 
Regarding instrumentality, we find that the participating MSRs are not matched to their own 
specific union counterpart in this study.  Rather we have taken both perspectives on the construct 
as a larger sample and demonstrate that the measure for counterpart instrumentality is correlated 
with climate such that both MSRs and union reps who feel that their counterpart is doing their 
job well report higher ratings of climate.
  
Table 4: Regression Results for Independent Variables and IR Climate: MSRs 
 Regression coefficient t-statistic 
Instrumentality 0.29* 2.37 
Informality 0.20 1.61 
Proactivity 0.23 1.88 
Cooperativeness 0.19 1.52 
Model 1: R2 .087; N=61; * significant at the 0.05 level. 
Table 5: Regression Results for Independent Variables and IR Climate: Union Reps 
 Model 1  Model 2  
 Regression coefficient t-statistic Regression coefficient t-statistic 
Informality 0.43*** 5.23 0.31** 3.56 
Instrumentality   0.30** 3.46 
Cooperativeness   0.17 1.76 
Model 1: R2 .188; Model 2 R2 .264 N=120; **, *** significant at the 0.01 and 0.001 levels, 
respectively. 
 
When we conducted regression analyses of our model, however a number of these 
relationships fell away. We may conclude from this analysis that although there are positive 
relationships across all key variables and IR climate, in the case of MSRs only their view of the 
instrumentality of their union representative counterpart retains a statistically significant 
relationship with IR climate. In contrast, the regression model for Union reps reveals that 
instrumentality and informality both retain relationships to positive IR climate.   
A number of the personal characteristics variables also produced interesting results. 
Organizational tenure had a negative correlation with IR climate while education had a positive 
correlation. However, neither of these held in regression models (data not shown). Regarding 
education, we had anticipated a potential relationship with MSR behavior due to the proliferation 
of higher education programs in employment relations.  We broke our sample into those with a 
  
Master’s degree or higher and those with less education than a Masters degree because 
specialized education in labor relations now tends to take place at the graduate level in Canada.2 
Of surprise to us, we found no significant relationships between education and any of our scales 
for MSR attitudes and behavior (cooperativeness, informality, proactivity or autonomy).   
 
Discussion  
This study drew from three unique research approaches (interviews, single case study and 
national self-report survey) and their resulting data samples to develop a model of the impact of 
front-line management-side labor relations representatives (MSRs) in shaping the industrial 
relations (IR) climate of their workplaces.   The data is broadly applicable to the North American 
context since labor relations structures at the firm and union level are similar in the two counties, 
despite lower union density in the United States.  Several industries and employers span the 
border, notably in the automotive sector as an example. 
Starting with a model of IR climate from the academic literature (Figure 1), we applied 
our interview and case study data to revise the model to one that considered the actions and 
behaviors of the MSR at the individual level (Figure 2). A subsequent test of different facets of 
this model using the national survey data informed the final most parsimonious model (Figure 3). 
Here, we propose that personal characteristics of the MSR (such as education, age, tenure), 
structural characteristics of the job (such as job autonomy) and attitudes of the MSR (such as the 
importance of cooperation in labor relations) are antecedents to the specific actions carried out 
by MSRs.   Second, we propose that these antecedents impact not so much the individual 
                                                 
2 French language universities are an exception; some Quebec universities offer specialized undergraduate programs 
in labor and employment relations, and the province regulates both an HR and an IR professional designation.  
However, since so few of our sample chose to take the French survey, we made an assumption that most participants 
received an English language post-secondary education 
  
behaviors in which MSRs engage (as there is relatively high consistency across the MSRs in all 
of our samples in terms of job tasks), but the way in which these behaviors are carried out. These 
include measures of instrumentality (as rated by a direct counterpart), the degree of informality 
(or comfort) in the relationships with counterparts, and the degree to which MSR actions model a 
proactive versus a reactive stance to managing labor relations issues.  Third, we propose that 
these measures of the quality and nature of the MSR actions (instrumentality, informality, 
proactivity) will all impact labor climate.   In short, it may not be what the MSR does, but how 
they do it that matters. 
This conclusion begs a deeper discussion of MSR education, training and capacity. 
Though research has suggested that training of union stewards leads to changes in behavior that 
impact cooperative labor relations (Wheeler & DeAngelis, 1982) and that education influences 
IR climate (Deery, Erwin & Iverson, 1999), we did not find a strong relationship between 
educational attainment and work practices, attitudes, and IR climate in our survey. It may be that 
the sample was too small to show effect, but it may also be that the content and approach of 
specialized industrial relations and/or human resources education is not addressing these 
dimensions of on-the-ground practice. As scholars and teachers in the field of industrial 
relations, we contribute directly to the body of knowledge, theory and practice of workplace 
relations and to the skills base of future practitioners in the field, while at the same time 
supporting institutional initiatives for higher education in IR and HR. Therefore, further study 
into the nature and impact of specialized IR and HR education on IR climate is warranted.    
Conversely or additionally, it could be that structural elements in the design of work and 
workplaces may be impeding realization of the full value of investment in specialized training in 
IR. MSRs are management employees and generally considered to be charged with 
  
implementing management policy in the workplace.  Theoretically, at least, they are appointed 
on merit and so qualifications, experience, capabilities, and specialized skills should predict 
success.  Given that the literature cited earlier in this paper demonstrates the value of positive IR 
climate for firm outcomes, we are left to wonder why the role of MSRs has not evolved to more 
fully capitalize on their inherent human capital.  Why have organizations not recognized the 
structural barriers that inhibit MSRs’ ability to alter their workplace practices and so allow them 
move away from reactive behaviors to engage in the authentic relationship-building tasks that 
MSRs know would improve IR climate? These are questions for further study. 
Just being in a union appears to hamper the climate rating, though this could be a 
reflection of an ideological stance.  Our findings for instrumentality, however, indicate that there 
is not a systematic difference between the perceived use-value of the two groups that would 
produce consistently more negative views on the part of union representatives. This challenges 
the ideological argument and raises additional questions about structural factors that may impact 
the labor relationship in the face of or despite positive personal relationships. As well, the ratings 
of the effectiveness (instrumentality) of one’s front-line counterpart appear to be related to both 
cooperativeness and positive labor climate.  These findings suggest that there is more to explore 
in the relationship between front-line workers in labor relations vis á vis the overall labor climate 
of a workplace. 
 
Figure 3: Revised model of MSR impact on IR Climate 
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Limitations and Future Research 
Our study has a number of limitations. First, we were constrained by our inability to 
obtain a single organization research site with both management and union participation which 
would have produced matched MSR-union representative samples.    
As a result, the resulting third study, a national poll of union- and management-side labor 
relations representatives, is weakened somewhat in its ability to explore IR climate in-depth in 
one organization; the ability to map MSRs' actions to a climate response from union reps; and 
the inability to assess whether MSR actions impact their union counterpart’s assessment of MSR 
instrumentality.  As well, although we collected this data, we could not test whether coaching 
and training activities on the part of MSRs and directed at front-line manager ‘clients’ had an 
impact on the IR climate. This would be more possible in a matched samples study in particular 
if data was also collected from front-line managers. We would recommend this for future 
research. To further probe the ‘black box’ we would also recommend additional qualitative 
research about the specific job activities of MSRs and, as shown above, the structural constraints 
MSRs may face in enacting their jobs and the nature and content of specialized IR training.  
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